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This article has two main goals. First, it describes the processes and practices 
of Somali marriages in Finland, in order to help fill the gap in the literature on 
Somali marriage practices. Particular attention is paid to three major aspects of 
the marriage process: finding a spouse, organising the marriage arrangements 
and the celebrations. The second goal is to contribute to the current debate on 
migration and arranged marriages. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the 
role of the family in these three aspects of marriage. This article draws from 35 
individual interviews, participant observations in five marriage ceremonies, as 
well as five focus group discussions. I argue that, despite the deep involvement 
of family members in the marriage process, unlike in forced and (common) 
arranged marriages, Somali couples take a leading role and make major 
decisions, although they are expected to seek their parents’ consent.
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Introduction
This article fills the gap in the literature on Somali marriage and 
shows that Somali marriage, as a rule, does not obstruct the 
agency and the autonomy of the couple. Little has been written 
about the marriage process among Somalis in general and among 
the diasporic Somalis in particular. Lewis’s (1994) and Luling and 
Adam’s (2015) studies represent the meagre scholarly literature that 
examines Somali marriage institution and describes its process and 
practices in a systematic manner. Lewis (1994) addresses marriages 
in the nomadic culture of northwestern Somalia. A large proportion 
of Somali people in other regions are also from this nomadic cultural 
background. Luling and Adam (2015), on the other hand, consider 
the case of the settled agriculturalists in southern Somalia, and their 
ethnographic data is collected from both Afgooye and London. The 
first part of the paper describes how weddings were performed in 
Afgooye, a small agro-pastoral town in the west of Mogadishu, in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The second part describes the ways in which 
marriage has changed, both in post-Civil War Afgooye and among 
Afgooye immigrants in the UK. These two traditional marriage 
customs in Somalia and the variations between them are somewhat 
moderated by the massive urbanisation of the past 60 years and, 
to a large extent, by the internal and external migration of a large 
proportion of the Somali people. Tiilikainen, Ismail and Al-Sharmani 
(2016) briefly discuss both aspects of marriage practices in Somalia 
and how they have changed in the diaspora.1
There is a growing political and public debate on arranged 
marriages among the Muslim migrant communities in Europe and 
elsewhere, which has resulted in the ‘politicisation of the family’ 
(Grillo 2008: 9). Two features make the Somali marriage relevant 
in this debate. First, the family is heavily involved in the marriage 
process, and second, Somali families have extensive transnational 
ties and networks that influence the marriage (Al-Sharmani & Ismail 
2017).
In the Nordic countries, the debate has presented Muslim marriage 
practices as problematic, traditional, monolithic and oppressively 
patriarchal (Häkkinen 2016: 11) and has attracted considerable 
attention from policy-making circles, academic research and the 
media. However, within these countries, there are differences in 
terms of both the focus of the debate and policy responses (Eggebø 
2010; Liversage & Rytter 2015; Pellander 2015; Razack 2004).
Arranged marriages are a typical example of marriage practices 
that have been associated with Muslim migrants. In this article, 
arranged marriage is understood as ‘the families of both spouses 
take a leading role in arranging the marriage, but the choice whether 
to solemnise the arrangement remains with the spouses and can be 
exercised at any time. The spouses have the right to choose – to 
say no – at any time’ (Home Office 2000: 10). Conversely, a forced 
marriage is ‘conducted without the valid consent of both parties, 
where duress is a factor’ (Ibid: 6). I also maintain that there is a wide 
range of forms of arranged marriages (Shaw 2001: 323–324; Stopes-
Roe & Cochrane 1990: 30). In addition, the contrast between love 
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marriages and arranged marriages is rightly questioned (Shaw 2001: 
324; Shaw & Charsley 2006: 416). In this article, choice is simply 
understood as an individual’s right to select a partner and accept a 
marriage proposal, and absence of a right to choose is what makes 
a marriage a forced one (Home Office 2000).
This debate is important here for a number of reasons (Grillo 
2011: 80). First, it has been argued that transnational arranged 
marriages are detrimental to the social welfare system and produce 
a parallel society in the country of settlement. It has been argued that 
this is so because, on the one hand, migrants are predominantly from 
societies that are backward and unable to adapt to life in the West 
and, on the other hand, arranged marriages continuously reproduce 
the customs and ways of life led by first-generation immigrants 
and thus further hamper the integration process. The result is the 
emergence of a social underclass, in which the majority of the first-
generation immigrants and their descendants lack the necessary skills 
for employment and thus become dependent on social welfare. The 
impact is a radical transformation of the egalitarian welfare society 
of the receiving countries. Therefore, by hindering the integration 
process, this kind of marriage migration is a threat to social welfare. 
Many of these studies are based on cases in the Nordic countries 
(Bonjour & Kraler 2015; Hagelund 2008; Wikan 2002). The main 
message of these voices is, as Sherene Razack puts it, that ‘Muslims 
come to the West drawn to its superior wealth. They bring with them 
a hopelessly feudal culture and must either be stopped altogether or 
be forcibly “deculturalised” before they multiply and contaminate the 
superior civilisation into which they have migrated’ (Razack 2004: 
131–132).
Secondly, another argument in the debate is that foreigners use 
marriage as a means to settle legally in Western Europe, and thus, 
arranged marriage is considered a strategy for migration and an 
avenue to the ‘promised land’ (Timmerman 2006: 125–128). For some 
countries, this has consequently led to the tightening of immigration 
policies in order to control the migration inflows (Liversage & Rytter 
2015; Pellander 2015).
Thirdly, and most importantly, by equating arranged marriage to 
forced marriage in public and political debates, the arranged marriage 
is associated with a number of humanitarian concerns with regard 
to individuals, particularly women and children (Okin 1999; Wikan 
2002; see Hagelund 2008 for a nice summary of this debate in the 
Scandinavian countries). This debate has encouraged the development 
of selective migration control measures (Gangoli et al. 2011: 31). It has 
also provided the means for radical right parties to build and capitalise 
on the situation for their own agendas (Siim and Skjeie 2008: 324).2 
In Finland, where Somalis represent the largest Muslim community, 
some organisations have tried to encourage the Finnish government 
to follow the example of other Nordic countries by outlawing forced 
marriage. However, the actual consequences of such efforts are 
unclear. The lack of a clear distinction between forced and arranged 
marriages is a main concern in this discourse (Bonjour & Kraler 2015). 
For instance, a piece published by a main daily newspaper, entitled 
‘Hints of arranged marriages among immigrants in Finland’, noted that, 
‘In Finland today, falling in love and personal choice are the important 
factors in choosing a partner. The idea of an arranged marriage is seen 
as a violation of human rights. This is not the case in the cultures of 
many immigrants’ (Hyvärinen 2002). This sounds like a reflection of 
the Danish Government’s action plan on arranged, quasi-forced and 
forced marriages (Liversage & Rytter 2015: 137).
In this debate, arranged marriages are considered detrimental 
to human rights and the economy (Eggebø 2010; Hagelund 2008; 
Pellander 2015; Razack 2004). To make the argument more 
appealing, arranged marriages are often conflated with forced 
marriage, wherein a lack of autonomy and agency among the young 
couple, particularly the girl, is the norm in most of the cases (Bonjour 
& Kraler 2015; Eggebø 2010; Liversage & Rytter 2015). A number of 
factors that annul, or at least mitigate, the autonomy and the agency 
of the young people in these marriages is presented: i.e. the role 
of parents in the decision-making process (Eggebø 2010; Liversage 
2012; Rytter 2012), cousin or close-relative marriage (Eggebø 2010; 
Liversage & Rytter 2015; Rytter 2012), searching for a partner 
from the country of origin (Bonjour & Kraler 2015; Liversage 2012; 
Liversage & Rytter 2015; Rytter 2012) and the type of new household 
for the young couple (Bonjour & Kraler 2015; Liversage 2012; Rytter 
2012).
This article has two main goals. Firstly, by describing the processes 
and practices of Somali marriages in Finland, this article will help fill 
the gap in the literature on Somali marriage. In what follows, particular 
attention is given to three dimensions of the marriage process: 
spouse selection, organising marriage and celebrations. Secondly, 
by examining these dimensions of the marriage process, this article 
shows that Somali marriage, as a rule, does not obstruct the agency 
and the autonomy of couple in the marriage process and thus it will 
contribute to the debate on migration and arranged marriages.
The first section of the article presents a brief description of the 
Somali community in Finland and the second section summarises the 
research background of the study. In Section 3, I describe marriage 
processes and practices among the diasporic3 Somalis in Finland. 
This section has three main subsections: meeting and selecting the 
marriage partner, organising marriages and marriage celebrations. 
The final section concludes the article.
Somalis in Finland
In 2015, the number of foreign language speakers in Finland was 
310,306 out of the total population of 5,471,753. In the early 1990s, 
a large group of Somali asylum seekers, escaping the Civil War, 
started arriving in Finland. In 2015, Somalis formed the third-largest 
immigrant group in the country, after Russians and Estonians. As 
Figure 1 shows, >60% of the 17,871 Somalis were ≤24 years old. 
Gender-wise, 8,521 were female and 9,350 male. A remarkably large 
number of the Finnish-Somalis (13,485) live in the Uusimaa region, 
particularly in Greater Helsinki4 (Statistics Finland 2015).
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However, Somalis in Finland face a great number of challenges: 
Adults face a harsh situation in the labour market. Their children 
have the highest school dropout rate and the poorest educational 
achievements compared to other communities. Identity crises and 
lack of belonging are also major problems among the Somali youth 
and children (OSF 2013). Notable difficulties within the family are 
also reported: in 2012, when 46% of Finnish-Somalis were children 
<18 years old, 38% of these children were raised by single mothers 
(Helminen & Pietiläinen 2014).
Data and Methods
This article is primarily based on 35 individual interviews, where the 
gender breakdown was 17 women (six single, seven married and four 
divorced) and 18 men (five single, eight married and five divorced), 
as well as observations and notes collected from five wedding 
ceremonies. In addition, five focus groups (two with women, two with 
men and one a mixed gender group) inform my analysis. The total 
number of participants in the focus group discussions was 39.
Interviews were conducted from the autumn of 2013 to the 
autumn of 2014, and the informants were recruited through personal 
networks and organisations. My colleague Mulki Al-Sharmani and I 
conducted all interviews. Al-Sharmani conducted all the interviews 
with female subjects, I conducted all the interviews with males, and we 
co-conducted one mixed-gender focus group. All interviewees were 
immigrants of Somali background, and all interviews were conducted 
in Somali. The age range of individual informants was early twenties 
to early fifties, with an average age of 28 and 38 for women and 
men, respectively. The interviewees’ duration of residence in Finland 
was between 5 and 24 years. On average, women had stayed about 
19 years, while men had stayed slightly >19 years in Finland. In 
addition, I conducted participant observations at five ceremonies, in 
which Islamic marriage contracts were officiated, in different parts 
of Helsinki: two in a mosque, two in private residences and one in a 
meeting hall in a public building.
Most of the informants were married to other Somalis; only one 
divorcee and two married persons had been married to a non-Somali-
speaking spouse. Most of the married informants had married after 
they had migrated to Finland and were married in Finland, while most 
of the divorcees, six out of nine, were married outside Finland. Most 
of those who got married in Finland after migration are still married, 
while most of those who got married outside Finland after migration 
are divorced.
Marriage Processes and Practices among 
Somalis in Diaspora
In this section, I describe three main dimensions of marriage process 
among Somalis in Finland: finding and selecting a spouse, organising 
the marriage and celebrations. Here, I pay particular attention to the 
differences between the marriage practices of the interviewees on 
the one hand and arranged or forced marriages on the other.
Finding and Choosing a Marriage Partner
Among Somalis in Finland, the role of the family in finding and 
choosing a marriage partner is important for various reasons. First, 
individuals mobilise their family networks in the marriage process 
because they see their involvement as useful. For example, they 
draw on the family’s support in finding a suitable partner and making 
an informed decision. Second, family members see their support 
of loved ones in the marriage process as a moral obligation. Third, 
a parent’s consent is considered vital for a successful marriage. 
However, as a rule, it is up to the future spouses to find and decide 
on their marriage partners in the first place; the role of the family is 
mainly to support them.
Unlike in nomadic contexts (Lewis 1994: 34), in the cities, both in 
Somalia and in the diaspora, interactions between marriageable men 
and women are more frequent and attraction occurs in a number of 
arenas, e.g. public spaces, schools, mosques, youth associations, 
relatives’ houses and cyberspace. The following example illustrates 
one of the ways in which people meet potential spouses.
Saxarla,5 a 26-year-old single woman, once arranged to meet a 
friend in an area frequented by Somalis in Helsinki. While she was 
with this friend, they also met the friend’s husband, who was coming 
out of a mosque in the neighbourhood with his friend. Her friend’s 
husband exchanged a few words with her and presented his own 
friend to her. After they finished their meeting, the two young women 
went home. In the evening, Saxarla’s friend called her, ‘Saxarla, 
you’re never gonna believe this! Your number is needed!’ The young 
man, who was with her friend’s husband, was trying to get in touch 
with her. Although Saxarla initially hesitated, her friend persuaded 
her to accept the initiation of the relationship.
As Saxarla’s story illustrates, men are expected to make the first 
move to initiate the relationship. A common feature of this process 
is that, to a great extent, a well-intentioned matchmaker,6 relative 
or friend, may play a role. The role of the matchmaker may be to 
make the referral. The following example shows how a sibling can 
indirectly play a role in this process. In this example, the future 
husband of Sureer was a close friend of her brother, and the latter 
used to talk about his friend’s good personal qualities at home long 
before Sureer’s relationship with her husband. Her brother even 
used to say ‘Sureer, you are a difficult person and he (his friend) 
alone can have a cohesive and resilient family with you’. Although 
the marriage relationship was initiated by her husband, her brother’s 
suggestions attracted her curiosity and guided her attention towards 
her prospective husband.
As Saxarla’s case illustrates, the matchmaker may also play 
the go-between role and navigate the process until the couple 
establishes contact. Others go beyond that by persuading their loved 
one to accept a particular marriage that they believe would work for 
the latter. In many of the cases in our data, it is the matchmaker 
that built the bridge or initiated the possibility of the whole idea of 
marriage. So the role of the extended family is vital here.
There are various reasons for the family’s involvement. For 
instance, such an intervention is needed when the prospective 
spouses live in different locations. Few of those informants who 
were married after they or their potential spouse moved to Finland 
knew their spouses prior to the marriage process. Nearly one-half of 
those who married after they migrated to Finland found their partner 
in another country. This kind of transnational engagement further 
extends the family’s role in the marriage process (Al-Sharmani & 
Ismail 2017). In some cases, members of the extended family are 
delegated to run the whole process. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
the majority of those Somalis who migrated to the West were young 
men. For instance, in 1992, more than three-quarters of Finnish-
Somalis at the age of 15–34 were men. Few of these young men 
were married before they migrated to Finland. Many of those who 
were single travelled to the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in the world 
to find a marriage partner.
Buulle, a 52-year-old married man, was among those who, rather 
than travelling, mobilised his transnational social networks to find a 
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suitable bride. His uncle, who was in another European country, was 
convinced that his friend’s granddaughter (who was at that time living 
in that country with her grandfather) would make a perfect match 
for his nephew. Both Buulle and his prospective wife accepted the 
proposal after their profiles, including photos, had matched their 
preferences. All marriage processes were held in that other country 
and Buulle’s uncle represented him in all aspects of the process. 
Nonetheless, Buulle covered most of the incurred expenses.
Saluugla, who met her Finnish-Somali prospective husband in 
Africa, confirmed that she was originally interested to marry someone 
with whom she could live in the West. Thus, migration could be an 
element in the selection process for the partner who resides in Africa. 
However, unlike the practice of some migrant groups, where the young 
people and/or their parents prefer a spouse who is a resident in the 
parents’ country of origin (Bonjour & Kraler 2015; Liversage & Rytter 
2015), Finnish-Somalis prefer a spouse residing in Finland (Al-Sharmani 
& Ismail 2017), and cross-border marriage is more like a ‘conscious 
negotiation process’ responding to ‘challenges in the local marriage 
market’ generated by a combination of ‘demographic structures and 
social networks’ (Bonjour & Kraler 2015: 1415). Sham marriage, where 
a young Finnish-Somali may deceive public authorities for someone 
to gain immigration, may exist, but regarding the community norms, 
this is not considered a marriage but a deception. In many of these 
cases it is the siblings or other unmarriageable family members who 
would present themselves as a new couple to mislead the authorities. 
Therefore, among Finnish-Somalis, transnational marriage cannot be 
considered as a main strategy for migration.
The interview data suggests that the right to choose one’s 
spouse was also present in pre-Civil War Somalia. In the case of 
some informants who got married in pre-Civil War Somalia before 
they migrated to Finland, their families were not necessarily involved 
in the process of finding a spouse and making the marriage decision. 
For instance, Siraad, a 40-year-old married woman, noted that 
she first met her husband on the road between Qoryooley and 
Mogadishu, while the car she was travelling in had broken down. Her 
future husband, with other young men, gave her and her friends a lift 
to Mogadishu. She exchanged telephone numbers with him during 
this trip.
Unlike among some other migrant groups (Liversage 2012; 
Rytter 2012: 576), in general, among the Finnish-Somalis, the 
couple lead the selection and decision-making processes, but they 
seek their parents’ consent later. Conversely, among some other 
migrant groups, parents not only lead the decision-making process 
but believe that it is their duty and obligation to find eligible matches 
for their children (Liversage 2012; Rytter 2012: 576).
Notably, after the attraction, with or without a matchmaker, the 
process of courtship starts. Six months to a year is considered the 
ideal duration for courtship. Here the main purpose is often to filter out 
potential marriageable partners. The initial stages of the screening 
process, the background check (i.e. clan identity, educational 
level and employment status), immediately begin. This is done by 
mobilising one’s social networks to find accurate information about 
the potential spouse.
If the social characteristics of the partner are adequate, then 
his or her attitudes and values towards the main areas relevant for 
married life (from their preferred marriage and family-life styles to 
compatibility of their attitudes towards general public issues, such 
as politics, culture and education) are deliberated upon in one way 
or another.
In the diaspora, as well as in the cities back home, before 
parents become aware of the relationship, the couple might meet in 
various places outside the woman’s home, such as in the house of 
the woman’s friend, or they might go out for dinner.7 Later, after the 
parents are informed, they could meet at the woman’s home. However, 
telephones, Skyping and social media are also extensively utilised. 
The following is an example of how these different mechanisms and 
venues are used in different stages of the process.
In the first stages of the process, Suubban, a 24-year-old married 
woman, avoided any medium of communication except email. 
The telephone was used only later, after the initial stages of the 
relationship had developed more seriously. Thirdly, meetings outside 
the home, mainly in a cafeteria, followed. Finally, after the family was 
informed and the fiancé was presented to them, meetings usually 
took place in the family’s house.
It is more likely that siblings and close friends are informed about 
the relationship first, while parents are alerted about the situation 
after that. In addition to parents, many of the siblings and friends feel 
morally obliged to support their loved ones in finding the right spouse. 
They may therefore play multiple roles at this stage by helping to 
gather the right information and by encouraging them. Saxarla’s story 
and the instrumental role played by her older sisters in the process 
constitute a good example.
Soon after the relationship commenced, her prospective 
husband informed her that he had made his decision to proceed 
and asked her if they could inform the parents about the situation. 
Saxarla, unhappy with that, asked for the process to be postponed. 
She also informed her married sisters, who are close to her, about 
the situation. Her sisters, particularly one who used to live in Finland, 
initially mobilised their networks to learn more about this young man 
and soon learned that he was a perfect match for their younger sister. 
They started persuading Saxarla, whose problem was the lack of 
romantic attachment (which she described ‘as lack of chemistry’) to 
her fiancé, to approve the process. In persuading her, they focussed 
on two main attributes of this young man, his personal qualities and 
his attitudes towards members of his extended family, especially 
those in need of his help. Saxarla highlighted, ‘My sister asked, 
“Saxarla, think about this! This man who is helping members of his 
extended family at that level, how will he be treating his wife?” She 
meant, he will be there for her!’ And Saxarla added, mixing Finnish 
with her Somali, ‘Kulli wey igu dhiiri galinaayeen laakiin, loppujen 
lopuksi, go’aanka ani waaye! (They all encouraged me to do it but, 
after all, the decision is mine!)’
In our data, there were two cases in which a parent was the 
main actor in the selection process. In one case, the informant was 
in Finland, while the future wife was in Somalia; in the other case, 
the informant was in Somalia and her future husband was in Finland. 
However, they both fully consented and played an active role in the 
process.
There were also two cases of consanguineous marriage, one male 
and one female, and in both cases, the prospective husbands, rather 
than parents, initiated the marriage idea. Therefore, consanguineous 
marriages may happen among the Somalis, however – unlike in some 
other cultures, where marrying the first cousin is considered ideal 
(Liversage & Rytter 2015; Rytter 2012) – these types of marriages 
are quite rare among the dominant Somali groups (with nomadic 
cultural background) and sometimes the first cousin marriage is 
somewhat taboo.
To sum up, the data shows that the involvement of the family in 
the spouse selection process does not necessarily indicate lack of 
agency on the part of future spouses. On the contrary, the couple 
are the main actors in the selection and decision-making processes. 
Clearly, individuals draw on the support of their family members, 
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including their transnational networks, in meeting and finding suitable 
partners and in making informed decisions.
Organising the Marriage Process
Somali families play an instrumental role in their children’s marriages, 
from matchmaking to organising a successful wedding ceremony. 
Naturally, to be part of the process, the marriage proposal should be 
acceptable for the parent. Thus, parental approval is quite essential 
for a socially acceptable and potentially successful marriage, and 
most informants believe that the role of the family is important. 
Therefore, as noted earlier, unlike the common arranged marriages 
– in which the parents take the leading role and main decisions but 
are expected to seek their children’s consent (Pande 2015: 173) 
– in Somali marriages, the future spouses take the leading role 
themselves and make the major decisions. But they are expected to 
seek their parents’ consent. Thus, in the normal procedure, a parent’s 
role comes later in the process.
Suubban, who married a Muslim Finn, noted that one day, 
her classmate in a course on Arabic language (her future spouse) 
approached her by asking if she could give him her father’s telephone 
number. By asking for her father’s number, he revealed his intention 
to ask for her hand in marriage. Suubban told:
I said to him hold on! Religiously your action might be ok, but (as 
Somalis) we have got a culture and approaching my father in this 
way will mean that I agreed with you on that … and my dad will 
misunderstand the situation.
As a recently married young man put it, when parents learn about 
the situation, they may send ‘a red light or a green light’. The red light 
indicates the parents’ rejection of the marriage idea, mainly due to the 
clan identity of the partner, and green light indicates that the parents 
are open to the idea. In the case of the red light, the situation becomes 
very disappointing as parental approval is considered important by 
both women and men for a successful marriage. In this case, the 
couple may abandon the marriage idea. They may alternatively take 
on the long and challenging process of trying to convince their parents 
to accept the process. According to our informants, this works well 
for some. Furthermore, elopement, traditionally practiced by young 
lovers in Somalia (Luling & Adam 2015: 155-156; Tiilikainen, Ismail 
& Al-Sharmani 2016: 49), is disappearing in the diaspora. There is 
no example of elopement in our data. One reason for this may be 
that many religious leaders discourage this practice and instead 
recommend other options. I encountered one case of parental 
rejection: in a ceremony that I attended, I learned that the groom’s 
mother initially strongly rejected the proposal due to the girl’s clan 
background, although she relented in the end. These cases clearly 
confirm that it is up to the couple to decide on their partners, and the 
parent’s role normally comes later.
In the case of the green light, the process of organising the 
marriage commences. Here, the man may start visiting the woman’s 
house and introduce himself to the woman’s family members, 
particularly to his prospective mother-in-law.
Bariise, a 27-year-old husband-to-be, met his soon-to-be mother-
in-law and, after a while, he met his prospective father-in-law, once 
the couple were ready for marriage. In addition to learning more about 
their prospective son-in-law, the main goal of the meeting between 
Bariise and his in-laws was the latter’s intention to make sure that 
everything was all right with the process.
At this point, another phase of the process – namely, the doonis 
(marriage proposal) – starts. The groom, along with his male 
relatives, occasionally also joined by his friends, meets the bride’s 
male relatives and his representatives ask for the bride’s hand. 
The doonis often takes place at the bride’s home – commonly, her 
parents prepare a special dinner for the guests – and occasionally at 
the mosque. Unlike other marriage proposals, e.g. rishta among the 
Pakistanis (Shaw & Charsley 2006), doonis is primarily proposing a 
marriage in a socially acceptable and culturally dignified way.
All doonis meetings I attended began with welcoming speeches 
by a member of the hosting group, a member of the woman’s 
relatives, a representative of the mosque, etc. Then a spokesperson 
for the man’s side thanked the hosts and delivered the doonis speech, 
after which the spokesperson for the woman’s side delivered their 
speech. The spokesman of the fiancé’s side thanked the fiancée’s 
representatives for accepting the proposal, and then a respected 
member from the fiancé’s side handed over the sooryo or gabbaati 
(betrothal gift), a small amount of money gift-wrapped in a cimaamad 
(men’s Muslim headscarf).
After a marriage proposal is accepted and the gift is handed over, 
the groom’s side may request that the nikaax process, completion 
of the formal marriage contract, take place immediately thereafter. 
However, since all the main issues, such as the kind and amount 
of meher/mahr (the bride’s personal dowry) must be agreed upon 
before the nikaax ceremony, that request happens only if parties 
have already negotiated and approved the process. It is up to the 
couples to decide these issues, but both families, particularly the 
bride’s family, may have considerable influence in the negotiations. 
For instance, all female informants agreed that it is up to the bride 
to decide what she wants as meher and the family’s role is that of 
guidance and advice.
The groom is also expected to give a gift of jewellery, mainly 
a relatively large gold jewellery set (including earrings, necklace, 
ring and probably bracelets), to the bride, and few husbands fail to 
provide it. Suubban noted:
He happened to be a non-Somali husband, otherwise I would 
have demanded ten thousand euros for the gold gift or at least 
five thousand euros would have been the minimum amount 
acceptable to me. But poor him! He brought with him only two 
thousand euros for the gold. I just took it because I was too kind 
to him
Certainly, very few brides receive €10,000 for a jewellery gift. This is 
quite a specific case with a young woman keen to make a point to 
her non-Somali husband as to how important it is for her to follow her 
cultural norms. Nevertheless, it shows how such a gift is vital for the 
Somali bride.
Prior to the aroos (wedding), and possibly nikaax, ceremony, a 
new residence is prepared for the new family. It is often the woman 
who chooses furniture for the new house. Although in the diaspora, 
more women, particularly of the younger generation, contribute to 
the costs of setting up the new matrimonial house, this responsibility 
is perceived primarily as belonging to the husband, who often 
receives support from his transnational family network to deal with 
the expenses.
Saado, a 22-year-old single woman, stressed that ‘in our culture, 
when marrying a Somali girl, you (the husband) have to pay the meher, 
furnish the new house, buy gold for her. Certainly, that is our culture!’
Normally, the bride’s family organises almost all the activities in 
the marriage process. The groom is usually expected to be available 
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to provide his services, by setting up the new furniture, support 
shopping activities, etc.
In some immigrant groups, newly married young couples 
customarily start their marriage life in a household headed by the 
parent of one of the young spouses. Although there are practical and 
economic advantages for the new couple in this practice, it is possible 
that one or both of the young couple might face new challenges, 
ranging from feeling uncomfortable in her/his house to gross human 
right violations, including corporal and emotional abuse (Bonjour & 
Kraler 2015; Liversage 2012; Rytter 2012). Conversely, among the 
Finnish-Somalis, it is up to the young people to decide where to 
live and, in general, neither parents nor young couple prefer for the 
newlywed couple to live in the parents’ house.
As noted, the family’s involvement in the marriage process is 
considered positive; however, some informants mentioned that the 
family involvement is sometimes detrimental to the formation of the 
new family. Two particular factors, the clan identities of prospective 
spouses and financial factors, were seen as transforming parental 
involvement into a negative experience. A female participant in one 
of the focus groups highlighted that:
… if you find a (marriageable) partner, the next challenge is that 
he might be distant from you, his clan may be different from yours 
and that may create misunderstandings within the family, that is 
quite possible! Another challenge is, in the weddings, one of the 
things people often complain about is the costs of weddings and 
stuff like that … It is possible that a mother wants her daughter’s 
wedding ceremony to be held in Hotel Kämp, the most expensive 
hotel in the city, but the man may not be able to afford it.
Other participants of the focus group agreed that these kinds of 
parental interventions are problematic.8
Again, a partner’s agency is quite evident in the doonis and other 
processes of organising a marriage, and the role of the family is to 
support.
Marriage Celebrations
After doonis, the nikaax, which could be organised on a separate day 
or on the same day as the aroos, takes place. The period of time 
separating the nikaax and aroos can be as short as one day or up 
to several years, depending on the context. For instance, a married 
female informed us that her aroos ceremony was planned to take place 
after she finished her schooling, several years after her nikaax. In the 
diaspora, the nikaax may take place in the bride’s family’s house, in 
a mosque or in a rented hall. The event may not be exclusive to the 
two lineage groups, especially if it is held in the mosque or in a hall. 
As noted, the bride and groom normally reach an agreement about 
the meher in advance. In some cases, the meher could be something 
symbolic, such as a copy of the Qu’ran, a trip to Meccah for umrah or 
a gold ring. In the diaspora, many lean towards this option. Siman, a 
28-year-old married woman, initially demanded €5,000 for her meher, 
but she later changed her mind by noting that since she is employed, 
she has little interest in securing such money for future safety.
The transnational context of many Somali families may 
necessitate the nikaax to be organised in another country, Somalia 
or elsewhere. This may be the case if the bride’s parents are in that 
other country or it is a transnational marriage where the bride and 
groom live in different countries. In this latter case, the nikaax is often 
held in the bride’s country.
Regarding the attendance, the actual site for nikaax is 
predominantly for men only. The women may be in other rooms of 
the same venue or the other side of a curtain-divided hall. The brides 
themselves rarely attend the ceremony. This, however, does not 
mean that brides were not involved in the process. On the contrary, 
as noted, they played a central role in the negotiation beforehand. 
When young female informants were asked whether they wanted to 
attend the nikaax or how they felt about not being there, they agreed 
that they did not feel the need to be present, and they did not feel 
excluded since they had already been involved in the negotiation. 
Thus, one informant was getting her hair done, in preparation for the 
wedding party, while the contract was taking place and her father 
called her to confirm the dowry amount and to let her know when the 
process was over.
In conducting the formal marriage contract, the role and presence 
of a Sheikh is imperative and, in general, the groom’s party brings the 
Sheikh with them.
In one of the nikaax events that I participated in, there were about 
200 male guests in the hall (women were in another hall). The event 
coordinator opened the event by welcoming the guests, thanking 
the bride’s parent for organising the event and highlighting that the 
doonis process had been conducted and that this was a nikaax 
event. After that, he gave the floor to the Sheikh, who conducted the 
contract and gave a short speech about marriage. Following short 
speeches of selected individuals, the banquet was served, and the 
male guests left.
Regarding who participates, separated from the nikaax ceremony, 
there are two main types of wedding ceremonies: a women-only 
ceremony and a mixed-gender ceremony.  Men-only wedding party 
is uncommon among Somalis (see also Tiilikainen 2003: 188‒196).
In addition, different versions of the todoba-bax, shaash-saar 
(mainly a women-only ceremony, partially held to symbolise the 
bride’s transition from girlhood to womanhood) or gaaf are also 
practised (Tiilikainen, Ismail & Al-Sharmani 2016: 51).
In short, ideally, the bride’s family organises the nikaax and aroos 
ceremonies. However, the spouses, particularly the bride, are the 
main decision-makers here too. They decide where, when and how to 
conduct these ceremonies. However, the bride’s family, as organisers 
of the ceremonies, naturally has its say in these processes.
Conclusion
In this article, I have studied the processes and practices of Somali 
marriages in Finland and in doing so, I have paid particular attention 
to three dimensions of the marriage process (spouse selection, 
marriage arrangements and celebrations). By describing these 
dimensions, I examined how the presence of parental involvement 
and transitional marriage practices of the Finnish-Somali marriages 
may render their marriages into conventionally defined arranged, or 
forced, marriages.
The Somali family plays an instrumental role in their children’s 
marriages, from matchmaking to organising a successful wedding 
ceremony. Several factors encourage parents and other family 
members to be involved in the marriages. First, the fact of living in 
the diaspora makes finding a suitable partner a challenging task in 
different ways; thus, members of transnational family networks may 
feel morally obliged to support their loved ones. Second, concerned 
with their children’s well-being, parents invest considerable effort in 
guiding their children about the importance of certain socioeconomic 
factors, such as education, employment, religion, etc., to help their 
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child make what they think is a rational decision and to dissuade them 
from making ill-informed choices based purely on romantic grounds. 
Finally, though weakening, factors such as clan are still important in 
the community.
The transnational dimension and deep family involvement in the 
process of Somali marriage is what most resembles the features of 
an arranged marriage. However, neither the arranged marriage in its 
conventional meaning (Home Office 2000: 10; Shaw & Charsley 2006: 
416),9 in which parents decide whom their children would marry, nor 
the forced marriage is commonly practiced. Most of our informants 
agree that it is up to the individual to find and decide when, how and 
whom to marry. The role of the family is to support their loved one to 
secure a happy married life. However, parents’ consent to marriage 
proposal is always considered essential. Thus, a Somali marriage 
may fall into the category of what Stopes-Roe and Cochrane (1990: 
30) describe as an independent arranged marriage, where the person 
makes her or his own selection and decision on whom to marry, but ‘it 
is expected that the parents also will be satisfied; in British families, 
this may be a hope rather than an expectation.’
In short, unlike the common arranged marriages – in which 
parents take the leading role and make the main decisions but are 
still expected to seek their children’s consent – in Somali marriages, 
it is the future spouses who take the leading role and make the major 
decisions, even if they seek their parents’ consent. Therefore, this 
article illustrates that the assumed binaries between traditional and 
modern, arranged and love marriages, are simplistic and invalid in 
the context of Somali marriages. The family’s role does not negate 
the agency of women and men in selecting their spouse, nor their 
autonomy in the marriage arrangements. Perhaps it would make more 
sense to describe Somali marriages as family-facilitated marriages, 
rather than family-arranged marriages. In addition, Finnish-Somalis 
prefer neither a cousin marriage nor a spouse in their parents’ country 
of origin. Finally, neither young couples nor their parents prefer for 
the newlywed couple to live in their parents’ homes. Thus, this article 
shows that Muslim marriage in the West is not as a rule detrimental to 
human rights and the welfare system and is not principally a strategy 
for migration.
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Notes
1. This article draws on a 4-year study, ‘Transnational Somali 
Families in Finland: Discourses and Lived Realities of Marriage’, 
which is the main sub-study of a larger project funded by the 
Academy of Finland (2013–2017) titled: ‘Transnational Muslim 
Marriages in Finland: Wellbeing, Law, and Gender’. The larger 
project, ‘Transnational Muslim Marriages in Finland: Wellbeing, 
Law, and Gender’ (2013–2017), is funded by the Academy of 
Finland and led by Dr. Marja Tiilikainen at the Department of 
Social Research, University of Helsinki. The main sub-study, 
‘Transnational Somali Families in Finland: Discourses and 
Lived Realities of Marriage’, is designed and led by Dr. Mulki Al-
Sharmani at the Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki. The 
overall research project investigates how Muslims in Finland 
organise and experience marriage in transnational space, as 
well as how the Finnish legal system and state institutions meet 
their needs and enhance their well-being.
2. For instance, after coming to power in Denmark in 2001, 
the Liberal-Conservative government introduced a new law 
setting the minimum age of both spouses applying for family 
reunification at 24 years or older.
3. I loosely use the term ‘diaspora’ as a group of people who live 
outside their home country for some time, but who maintain 
some ties with their country of origin (Remennick 2007). For 
more on the diaspora, see Safran (1991) and Cohen (1997).
4. Statistics Finland, Population Structure.
5. All names are pseudonyms.
6. Here, I use the term ‘matchmaker’ loosely for anyone contributing 
to the process of mate selection.
7. In order to preserve their reputations, many girls are reluctant to 
go out with men before the process of integration commences.
8. However, a well-informed religious scholar told me that the 
number of cases where parents reject the proposal on the basis 
of the clan affiliation of the potential spouse of their child is 
decreasing significantly.
9. Stopes-Roe and Cochrane (1990: 30) call this a ‘traditionally 
modified arranged marriage’.
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